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Abstract
This Position Paper contains statements drafted 
by several Research Groups at the Weizenbaum 
Institute concerning the Data Governance Act 
(DGA) Proposal. Each statement is followed by 
a short explanation. The purpose of this Paper is 
to highlight a number of important aspects of the 
DGA Proposal and stimulate the debate around it 
with a special emphasis on the part that concerns 
regulation of data sharing services (Chapter III, 
DGA Proposal). The Paper touches upon a num-
ber of selected matters without the ambition to co-
ver all the important issues the DGA legislation 
raises. The statements address the potential risks 
in creating a centralized architecture for data in-
termediaries, the problem of imposing a duty on 
data sharing services to offer data on a non-discri-
minatory basis, the role and expertise supervision 
authorities will need to assume and exercise and 
questions regarding the interface between the an-
ticipated DGA and existing data protection law in 
the EU. The Paper includes a number of specific 
recommendations regarding the formulation of se-
veral DGA provisions, specifically in connection 
with its intersection points with the GDPR.
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1 Architecture and Governance of Data Intermediaries
1.1 Centralized architecture that amasses large 
quantities	of	personal	and	confidential	data	
in the hands of data intermediaries might 
increase the potential for privacy breaches 
and power asymmetry risks.
Data intermediaries such as data sharing services 
are a central pillar of the current DGA concept. 
They are expected “to increase trust in sharing per-
sonal and non-personal data and lower transaction 
costs linked to B2B and C2B data sharing” (DGA 
Proposal Explanatory Memorandum, Section 5). 
The current proposal sets out to outline require-
ments and a notification regime for data sharing 
providers so that they gain the trust of data produc-
ers. The specifics of how data sharing services can 
be designed and operated have so far largely been 
left open, raising concerns that the encouragement 
of such novel data intermediaries might lead to new 
and exaggerated privacy and confidentiality risks.
Data intermediaries designed as data storage and 
redistribution platforms necessarily have full ac-
cess over the data they store. Additionally, popular 
data intermediaries will likely mediate data from 
a large number of original data sources, making 
them an especially attractive target for cyberat-
tacks, among other things. The possibility that data 
intermediaries could reach near-monopoly status in 
a given data sharing context might actually be con-
sidered a desirable effect in the context of reducing 
data sharing costs, as such intermediaries would 
become “one-stop shops”.
The centralized storage of large amounts of sen-
sitive data is to be scrutinized in the face of pos-
sible threats from cyber criminals and foreign in-
telligence services. Additional risks result from 
the fact that while the misuse of stored data can be 
constrained through appropriate legal framing and 
organizational measures, there is no guarantee that 
protection standards and control mechanisms will 
retain their quality throughout the whole duration 
of data storage. If legal and organizational condi-
tions change, the collected data might lead to the 
affected data subjects and enterprises being harmed 
in ways considered unacceptable at the time of ini-
tial data collection.
Risks resulting from excessive and excessively 
centralized data collection can be mitigated by dis-
incentivizing data intermediaries from storing sen-
sitive data in the first place. From an IT security 
standpoint, each additional data storage location 
implies an additional point at which data can be 
leaked, stolen or (unlawfully) monitored.
Depending on the anticipated data usage context, 
it might be fully sufficient for data sharing services 
to store only rigorously anonymized data. Nota-
bly, this approach does not prevent data sharing 
services from supporting data producers with the 
anonymization of their data. Data sharing services 
can offer consultation services or even perform the 
anonymization themselves, as long as they can be 
obliged to delete their copies of the original data 
immediately after anonymization. Lastly, concepts 
for data sharing services are conceivable in which 
intermediaries are only the middlemen between the 
data providers and data users. Data can then flow 
directly between the providers and users, thereby 
minimizing the number of additional data copies.
1.2 Ensuring non-discriminatory data access 
via	data	sharing	services	is	not	sufficiently	
guaranteed. In particular, there is a lack 
of	 precise	 specifications	 for	 the	 required	
design in practice.
The DGA emphasizes the importance of „fair, 
transparent and non-discriminatory“ access to data 
not only for the re-use of protected data held by 
public sector bodies but also in particular for the 
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requirements for data access via data sharing ser-
vices. According to Art. 11(3) of the DGA Propos-
al, a data sharing service provider has to ensure that 
the process for access to its service is fair, transpar-
ent, and non-discriminatory for both data holders 
and data users – with regard to the conditions of ac-
cess as well as to prices. However, aside from this 
vague objective and with regard to data sharing ser-
vices, the legal text of the DGA Proposal does not 
provide precise specifications of how non-discrim-
inatory access is to be ensured in practice. Also, 
the recitals remain silent on this point, offering no 
further guidance for interpretation. In this respect, 
it is left to the Member States, through the compe-
tent authorities with supervision powers under Ar-
ticle 13 of the DGA Proposal, to set more precise 
instructions. More specific guidelines in the DGA 
would be preferable, however, especially with the 
aim of supporting small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) and ensuring a more systematic harmoni-
zation across EU member states.
Particularly concerning the prices to be paid for 
the data provided, there is a risk of disadvantaging 
smaller and/or financially weaker companies (such 
as non-profit organizations). Even if prices and ac-
cess conditions are equal for all data users (e.g., 
while applying uniform prices), the price might 
be prohibitively high for smaller actors and might 
therefore inhibit participation in data sharing ser-
vices of SMEs or research institutions. Due to the 
DGA’s notification regime of data sharing services 
and the associated special status of data sharing 
service providers, risks of indirect discrimination 
should be addressed in the DGA.
Even though the risk of discrimination is general-
ly taken into consideration in Art. 11(3), unlike the 
provision on data re-use by public sector bodies (see 
Chapter II of the DGA Proposal), the provisions on 
data access via data sharing services (Chapter III 
of the DGA Proposal) do not provide any practical 
guidance beyond this point. It is important that SMEs 
and non-profit organizations without large capital re-
sources can also participate in the new opportunities 
for shared data use. Desired innovations often hap-
pen at the level of startups or research institutions.
In particular, there is a misalignment between data 
re-use from public sector bodies and data sharing 
via data sharing services. For comparison: In Art. 
6(4) of the DGA Proposal, it is expressly stipulated 
that public sector bodies shall financially incentiv-
ize the re-use of data for non-commercial purposes 
and by SMEs in line with state aid rules. Compa-
rable guidelines should also be established with re-
gard to data access via data sharing services. For 
instance, the DGA could contain provisions man-
dating basic public funding possibilities in line 
with state aid rules, thus facilitating participation 
in data sharing services for specific categories of 
companies and/or types of data uses. Without any 
such provision, participation of SMEs in data shar-
ing services cannot be sufficiently ensured.
1.3 Supervisory bodies and consultation ser-
vices in connection with data sharing via 
intermediaries must be equipped with sig-
nificant	 in-house	 expertise	 to	 ensure	 the	
effective	application	of	privacy-enhancing	
measures such as anonymization by the 
data intermediary.
The choice of suitable technical and organizational 
measures for balancing data usage with associated 
privacy risks as well as the actual potential and lim-
its of such measures are decisively influenced by 
the specific context of the desired data usage. Ap-
proaches such as anonymization, pseudonymiza-
tion or the generation of synthetic data are not uni-
versal solutions that achieve satisfactory results by 
themselves. Each data usage scenario is associat-
ed with an individual notion of utility, and differ-
ent types of data imply different types of privacy 
threats and linkage-based deanonymization possi-
bilities. For example, location data requires inher-
ently different approaches to anonymization than 
tabular health data.
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A wide range of successful de-anonymization attacks 
on (in hindsight) inadequately anonymized data sets 
furthermore demonstrate that effective, utility-pre-
serving anonymization is a non-trivial task. As recent 
results show, even promising new approaches such 
as the generation of synthetic data from privacy-rel-
evant data sets are demonstrably not better than ano-
nymization in terms of the data utility / privacy-pres-
ervation trade-offs they imply. It must also be noted 
that the state of the art of both privacy enhancement 
and privacy attacks is constantly evolving. Even in 
cases where the particularities of individual specif-
ic contexts are taken into account when developing 
a data protection strategy, deployed systems might 
need to be reexamined periodically.
One consequence to be derived from the above ob-
servations is that privacy-relevant data should be 
handled with extreme care, even if it is reportedly 
anonymized. Control bodies must be established to 
continuously monitor key actors of the data shar-
ing economy, including large data sharing inter-
mediaries, evaluating their operation in light of 
the current state of research. Consultation bodies 
should provide objective expertise with respect to 
privacy risks and the choice and implementation of 
specific technical and organizational data protec-
tion approaches. The difficulty of maintaining pri-
vacy standards while achieving adequate data util-
ity makes the availability of adequate expertise a 
necessity. To ensure the objectivity of control and 
consultation bodies and reduce their dependence 
on large private-sector actors, control and consul-
tation bodies should be equipped with sufficient or-
ganizational and financial flexibility to attract and 
maintain relevant technical expertise in-house. Sig-
nificant in-house expertise on technical matters is a 
key requirement for any agency tasked with over-
seeing the correct realization of data protection reg-
ulation and other data-related regulation.
2 The Interface between Data Protection Law and the DGA
2.1 The DGA should build on the strong data 
protection laws in the EU already in place. 
It should not be conceived as altering or 
limiting the rights and duties stipulated in 
existing	data	protection	laws.
The DGA Proposal is rather clear when it comes to 
the intended relationship to the GDPR, as it repeated-
ly states that its rules should “be without prejudice” 
(Art. 3(3)(2), 9(2), Recitals 3, 28 DGA Proposal) to 
the GDPR, and specific norms such as the European 
Data Altruism Consent Form (Art. 22 DGA Propos-
al) should be “in full compliance with the data protec-
tion rules” (Recital 39 DGA Proposal). Furthermore, 
the DGA even aims to increase “the control that nat-
ural persons have over the data they generate”.[1] In 
conclusion, from a data protection perspective, the 
DGA builds on existing data protection legislation 
and is not intended to alter said legislation.
This approach is a good choice as current data 
protection legislation guarantees a thorough level 
of self-determination, security and trust for data 
subjects. While the economic value of data is un-
disputed, lowering the safety net is not the right 
approach. This does not only hold true from a 
fundamental rights perspective, but also from an 
economic point of view: While the main purpose 
of data protection laws should be the protection 
of the individual’s personality rights, Europe-
an data protection legislation and especially the 
GDPR have a positive auxiliary effect. The Eu-
ropean Union has managed to create a worldwide 
leading level of trust that can be used by compa-
nies as a brand selling point (cf. the certification 
mechanisms in Art. 42 GDPR) and could drive 
business within the European Union. This long-
term advantage should not be dismissed in favor 
of short-term economic considerations.
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2.2 The DGA should apply to the sharing of 
personal	data.	Excluding	such	data	would	
lead to a lower level of protection and se-
curity for personal data.
It would not be appropriate to exclude personal data 
if the GDPR and DGA are supposed to complement 
each other, as stated above. The sharing of personal 
data represents an important part of the ambition 
to support the economy through simplified data 
traffic. The European Data Strategy already states 
the intention to establish a single European data 
space.[2] It is noteworthy that the majority of eco-
nomically relevant data is personal data. Therefore, 
the DGA would lose a large part of its scope if per-
sonal data were excluded. The objective of promot-
ing data trading can only be achieved if personal 
and non-personal data are regulated holistically.
The DGA is intended to support the enforcement 
of a high level of data protection, which was estab-
lished by the GDPR. However, without the inclu-
sion of personal data, the additional assurance of 
the level of protection would be omitted. A regula-
tion that complements the protection of the GDPR 
can be found, for instance, in Art. 11(10) DGA Pro-
posal, which intends to assist data subjects in exer-
cising their rights, in particular by advising them.
Finally, from a practical perspective, it is difficult 
to distinguish between personal and non-personal 
data. As noted in the EDPB-EDPS joint opinion, 
this problem exists especially when large collec-
tions of data sets are involved.[3]  It must be taken 
into account that the bundling of data is a certain 
consequence of the DGA.
2.3 Including personal data further normaliz-
es the commercialization of personal data. 
This is a political decision and it should be 
a conscious one.
While the only viable solution is to include personal 
data within the Data Governance Act, doing so adds 
to the ongoing legal acknowledgement of the idea of 
a commercialization of personal data. A first step in 
this direction was taken with the adoption of the idea 
of data as a counter-performance in the Directive 
on Digital Content and Digital Services (DCDS)[4], 
where the situation was similar: Leaving out per-
sonal data would have lowered the level of protec-
tion for customers paying with their data even fur-
ther.[5] However, through such developments, the 
idea of monetizing personal data is subtly furthered. 
Although there have been some critical voices in the 
past, there seems to have been little public discus-
sion about the question of whether we – as a society 
– actually want to advance the commercialization 
of personal data and, if so, how this can be achieved 
while at the same time upholding the individual’s 
right to self-determination. Once again, it seems this 
discussion is being avoided in the current debate. On 
a similar note, the EDPB-EDPS conclude „that this 
policy trend toward a data-driven economy frame-
work without a sufficient consideration of personal 
data protection aspects raises serious concerns from 
a fundamental rights viewpoint”, and specify, „The 
clear incentive to ‘monetize’ personal data also in-
creases the importance of checks on data protection 
compliance. Regrettably, in this regard, as well as 
in relation to the other chapters of the Proposal, the 
impact assessment does not take the data protection 
risks into account.”[6]
When compared to the commercialization of other 
personal rights, especially the right to one‘s own 
image, the lack of discussion becomes even more 
apparent. As early as the invention of photography, 
questions surrounding the commercialization of 
one‘s own image have sparked a broad discussion 
covering judicial disputes, legal and economic ar-
ticles as well as general public discussions.[7] In 
a similar manner, the possibility of a commercial-
ization of moral rights has been, and still is, at the 
center of legal and political discussions, focusing 
especially on the limits of such a commercializa-
tion, established in some jurisdictions through in-
alienable parts of the droit moral.[8]  In contrast, 
there seems to be little to no substantial debate or 
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legislative efforts concerning the monetization of 
personal data. While the GDPR mandates gener-
al rights and duties concerning the processing of 
personal data, it does not explicitly regulate the as-
pect of a commercialization of such data. Although 
the so-called „prohibition of coupling“ (Art. 7(4) 
GDPR) can be seen as proof of an engagement with 
this question, its final wording turned out to be so 
vague that it has had little effect on business-mod-
els of personal data as a counter-performance.
The intention here is neither to make an argument 
in favor or against the commercialization of per-
sonal data, and it is not proposed to either explicitly 
acknowledge or prohibit such business models. The 
aim is merely to shed light on this discussion that, 
considering its relevance, seems underdeveloped.
2.4 The DGA should prominently recognize 
the general applicability of the GDPR. 
Isolated references to the GDPR should 
be avoided.
Since the delineation between personal and non-per-
sonal data is essential for implementing data pro-
tection, the relationship between the GDPR and the 
DGA should be clarified explicitly at a prominent 
spot within the DGA‘s main body. The regulation of 
a horizontal applicability of the GDPR, as proposed 
in Art. 1(3) DGA-Council (Presidency compro-
mise text of 22 February 2021 (2020/0340(COD))), 
would prevent the risk of creating an additional le-
gal basis for the processing of personal data and 
would integrate the principles of the GDPR.
In addition, the DGA should have no additional spe-
cific references to established rights and duties un-
der the GDPR, unless strictly necessary. If the DGA 
is clear about the unconditional applicability of the 
GDPR, such additional links can lead to legal un-
certainty. If specific rights or duties are referenced 
in specific contexts, the omission of other rights or 
duties or of the same rights or duties in different 
contexts of the DGA would lead to uncertainty as to 
why a specific right or duty was (not) mentioned in 
a specific context of the DGA.
For example, Art. 22(3) DGA Proposal states that 
„the European data altruism consent form shall 
ensure that data subjects are able to give (…) and 
withdraw consent“ in compliance with the GDPR. 
This raises the question of why the possibility of 
giving and withdrawing consent was mentioned and 
whether, as an argumentum e contrario, other du-
ties of the GDPR, especially informational duties, 
should not apply. Similarly, Art. 9(2) DGA Proposal 
states that the „Chapter [concerning Data Sharing 
Services] shall be without prejudice to the appli-
cation of other Union and national law“, including 
such on „the protection of personal data“. Again, 
this leads to uncertainty as it might lead to the con-
clusion that, for example, Chapter IV on data altru-
ism should indeed be with prejudice to data protec-
tion legislation. In conjunction with the intended 
general reference, such references appear unneces-
sary, if not misleading, and should be removed.
2.5 The	 DGA	 should	 differentiate	 between	
the legal consequences for personal and 
non-personal	data	only	where	such	differ-
entiation is absolutely necessary.
As the demarcation of personal and non-personal 
data is exceedingly difficult, from a compliance per-
spective it is recommendable not to mandate differ-
ing legal consequences for each type of data, unless 
unavoidable. At the same time, it can be useful to 
explicitly mention both types of data for clarifica-
tion purposes, even when they are treated the same.
This idea seems to be included in the current DGA 
draft and the proposed amendments thereto. Espe-
cially in Chapter II, which complements the Open 
Data Directive with respect to data protected by 
third parties’ rights, it is necessary and sensible to 
only refer to personal data and to implement sepa-
rate rules where there is a specific need for it.[9]  In 
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other parts, there seem to be no differing legal con-
sequences depending on the type of data.
As noted, explicitly mentioning personal and 
non-personal data can sometimes make sense when 
the same legal consequences are mandated for both 
types of data. Such a distinction could actually pre-
vent inconsistencies with data protection legisla-
tion and improve the clarity of the DGA.
Contrary to the statement of the EDPB and EDPS 
in their joint opinion, the DGA does not blur the 
distinction between personal and non-personal data 
by creating a parallel set of rules for personal data 
outside the GDPR.[10] This problem does not exist 
if the GDPR applies without exceptions to all per-
sonal data within the DGA, as this prevents a con-
tradiction between the two regimes. The primacy of 
the GDPR also for mixed data sets is noted in the 
compromise proposal.[11] The foregoing is under-
scored by the fact that data sets often cannot be eas-
ily separated into the categories of person-related 
and non-person-related. A division of the regulatory 
text would therefore also be unsuitable from a prac-
tical point of view.
2.6 Instead of introducing new legal termin-
ology in relation to personal data, the DGA 
should use the terminology established un-
der	the	GDPR	to	the	extent	possible.
In order to avoid friction between the two legal 
frameworks, the DGA should adopt the legal termi-
nology in relation to personal data as set out in the 
GDPR. The resulting clearer terminological delim-
itation would lead to more legal certainty and thus 
to a simpler application of the law. New terminolo-
gy should only be introduced in relation to non-per-
sonal data. Hereby, the high level of protection of 
personal data under the GDPR regime is ensured 
and the inseparable link between the right to infor-
mational self-determination and the data subject, 
who should have autonomy of choice over his or 





reference to the GDPR.
The DGA introduces the new term “data holder”. 
It is defined as a “legal person or data subject who 
(…) has the right to grant access to or to share cer-
tain personal or non-personal data under its con-
trol”. The DGA hereby conflates the already exist-
ing definition of „data subject“, which is defined 
in Art. 4(1) GDPR as an identified or identifiable 
natural person, with the new terminology.
However, for a simpler application of the law 
and a clearer linguistic delimitation, it is desir-
able to define the “data holder” and “data subject” 
separately.[12]  By excluding “data subjects” from 
the definition of „data holder“ and defining it with 
reference to Art. 4(1) GDPR, a parallel to the GDPR 
is created, emphasizing the continued standard of 
protection for personal data in the DGA.
The DGA should, whenever it refers to personal 
data granted access to (cf. These III. 2.) or shared 
by „data subjects“, use the terms „data subject“ and 
„consent“ in the sense of the GDPR, in order to 
clearly demonstrate the lawfulness of the processing 
of personal data in accordance with the GDPR. For 
the incorporation of the term „consent“ in the defi-
nitions listed in Art. 2 DGA, a dynamic reference to 
Art. 4(11) GDPR is also conceivable. Since only a 
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“data subject” can consent to the processing of his or 
her data according to this definition, the term „con-
sent“ should not be used for “data holders”. While 
“data holders” can receive “consent” from a “data 
subject” - including the right to have third parties 
process the data – they can never consent themselves 
on behalf of the data subject. Therefore, whenever 
data is being granted access to or shared by data 
holders, the terms „data holder“ and „permission“ 
should be used. If „data subjects“ and „data holders“ 
are to be regulated, both shall be mentioned. In ad-
dition to adapting the definitions in Art. 2 DGA, the 
terms should be adjusted throughout the DGA. The 
clear differentiation between „consent“ and „permis-
sion“ ensures that any authorization to process data 
is always traceable to the data subject.
The exclusion of “data subjects” from the scope of 
Art. 2(5) DGA has the effect that only legal persons 
are covered by the definition. However, a natural 
person can also be a „data holder“ without being 
a „data subject“. Therefore, natural persons should 
be included in the definition. In deviation from the 
Council proposal [13], instead of using the term 
“legal entity”, the term “natural or legal person“ 
ought to be used in accordance with the wording in 
Art. 2(2), (4), (6) DGA.[14]
3.2 The	 term	 „access“	 in	 Art.	 2(5),	 (6),	 (8)	
DGA Proposal should be replaced by the 
term	„processing“.
Under the current proposal, the term „access“ is de-
fined in Art. 2(8) DGA-Proposal as „processing by 
a data user of data that has been provided by a data 
holder, in accordance with specific technical, legal, or 
organizational requirements, without necessarily im-
plying the transmission or downloading of such data“. 
The term „access“ can further be found in the defini-
tions of „data holder“ in Art. 2(5) DGA Proposal - a 
person who has the right to grant access to data - and 
„data user“ in Art. 2(6) DGA Proposal - a person who 
has lawful access to data and is authorized to use it.
In the definition, „access“ is described as „process-
ing“. „Processing“ is a term that is already defined 
in Art. 4(2) GDPR as „any operation or set of op-
erations which is performed on personal-data or on 
sets of personal-data in electronic format, wheth-
er or not by automated means, such as collection, 
recording, organization, structuring, storage, ad-
aptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, 
disclosure by transmission, dissemination or other-
wise making available, alignment or combination, 
restriction, erasure or destruction.“.
The literal meaning of the term „access“ inade-
quately describes the practice of processing data. 
A dynamic reference to the GDPR as a definition 
of „processing“ in the DGA would be insufficient 
though, as the definition of „processing“ in Art. 2(4) 
GDPR only refers to personal data while the DGA 
captures both personal and non-personal data. The 
definition of „processing“ in the DGA should there-
fore be identical in wording, except that it should en-
compass personal and non-personal data alike. This 
modified definition would only change the scope but 
not the concept of „processing“, which technically 
functions in the same way for all kinds of data.
In addition to defining „access“ as „processing“, 
Art. 2(8) DGA Proposal further requires this pro-
cessing to be „in accordance with specific technical, 
legal, or organizational requirements, without nec-
essarily implying the transmission or downloading 
of such data“. This requirement arises either from 
the GDPR or from other legal instruments which 
apply alongside the DGA. Therefore, the wording 
is not needed and does not need to be adopted un-
der the definition of “processing”.
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